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Abstract
How much would output increase if underdeveloped economies were to
increase their levels of schooling? We contribute to the development ac-
counting literature by describing a non-parametric upper bound on the
increase in output that can be generated by more schooling. The advan-
tage of our approach is that the upper bound is valid for any number of
schooling levels with arbitrary patterns of substitution/complementarity.
Another advantage is that the upper bound is robust to certain forms of
endogenous technology response to changes in schooling. We also quan-
tify the upper bound for all economies with the necessary data, compare
our results with the standard development accounting approach, and
provide an update on the results using the standard approach for a large
sample of countries.
Keywords: development accounting, imperfect substitution
1 Introduction
Low GDP per worker goes together with low schooling. For example, in
the country with the lowest output per worker in 2005, half the adult
population has no schooling at all and only 5% has a college degree
(Barro and Lee, 2010). In the country with output per worker at the
10th percentile, 32% of the population has no schooling and less than 1%
a college degree. In the country at the 25th percentile, the population
shares without schooling and with a college degree are 22% and 1%
respectively. On the other hand, in the US, the share of the population
without schooling is less than 0.5% and 16% have a college degree.
To some extent, such di¤erences in attainment could reect e¢ cient
schooling decisions in response to international di¤erences in technology
or institutional quality (e.g. Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Rosenzweig
and Munshi, 2006; Jensen, 2010). On the other hand, it seems highly
plausible that schooling attainment in poor countries is also limited by
lack of access to schools (particularly in rural areas), and credit con-
straints that force parents to send children to work in order to provide
for current consumption. Credit constraints also limit poor parentsca-
pacity to cover tuition, uniforms, and meals. Consistent with the view
that there are barriers to investment in schooling, Duo (2001) nds
large enrollment e¤ects from an expansion in public school provision,
and Schultz (2004) from the introduction of a conditional cash transfer
program. The crucial importance of public funding (and other govern-
ment policies) to enable mass schooling is discussed at length in Goldin
and Katz (2008). It is also consistent with the existence of barriers to at-
tainment that the returns to schooling are higher in poor countries than
in rich ones (e.g. Bils and Klenow, 2000). The view that schooling at-
tainment is in part limited by lack of access and credit constraints has led
national governments, bilateral and multilateral donors, and civil-society
NGOs to prioritize schooling attainment among their development goals
for several decades. For example, one of the millennium development
goals is universal education.
But how much of the output gap between developing and rich coun-
tries can be accounted for by di¤erences in the quantity of schooling?
Early empirical attempts to answer this question using cross-country
data focused on regressions of growth (or GDP levels) on measures
of educational enrollment or attainment (e.g. Barro, 1991; Mankiw,
Romer and Weil, 1992; Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994; Caselli, Esquivel,
and Lefort, 1996; see Krueger and Lindhal, 2001 for a survey and evalu-
ation of this literature). One di¢ culty with this literature is that results
on the impact of schooling did not prove robust to alternative measures
of the education variable, the sample, or the estimation method. Also,
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it proved di¢ cult to tackle the problem of endogeneity of schooling.
In part in response to these di¢ culties with the regression approach, a
second wave of studies focused on calibration rather than estimation (e.g.
Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare, 1997; Hall and Jones, 1999; Hendricks,
2002), giving rise to a thriving new literature known as development
accounting. A robust result in the development accounting literature is
that only a relatively small fraction of the output gap between developing
and rich countries can be attributed to di¤erences in the quantity of
schooling.1 This result appears to dampen expectations that current
e¤orts at boosting schooling in poor countries, even if successful, will do
much to close the gaps in living standards.2
The somewhat negative result from development accounting is ob-
tained using a parametric approach. Technology di¤erences across coun-
tries are assumed to be skill neutral, and workers with di¤erent attain-
ment are perfect substitutes. Relative wages are then used to gauge the
relative e¢ ciency in production of workers with di¤erent attainment. A
potential concern is that there is by now a consensus that di¤erences in
technology across countries or over time are generally not Hicks-neutral,
and that perfect substitutability among di¤erent schooling levels is re-
jected by the empirical evidence (e.g. Katz and Murphy, 1992; Angrist,
1995; Goldin and Katz, 1998; Autor and Katz, 1999; Krusell et al., 2000;
Ciccone and Peri, 2005; and Caselli and Coleman, 2006). Once the as-
sumptions of perfect substitutability among schooling levels and Hicks-
neutral technology di¤erences are discarded, can we still say something
about the output gap between developing and rich countries attributable
to schooling?
Answering this question while sticking to a parametric approach re-
1Recently this result has been challenged by Gennaioli et al. (2012), who argue
that much of top managers and entrepreneurs returns to schooling are formally
earned as prots, and therefore unaccounted for by standard microeconomic esti-
mates of the returns to schooling - a key ingredient in most development-accounting
calculations. After accounting for managersreturns to schooling, they argue that the
average Mincerian return to schooling is around 20%, about double what is usually
found in the literature. Using this higher return leads to a large increase in the ex-
planatory power of human capital for income di¤erences. Gennaioli et al.s estimate
of managersreturns to schooling is based on rm-level valued-added regressions that
do not control for manager characteristics other than schooling. As such character-
istics may be correlated with managersschooling, it is di¢ cult to know what part
of the return can be attributed to schooling only.
2Partially in response to these ndings, some authors have advocated a shift to
cross-country di¤erences in the quality of schooling (e.g. Hanushek and Woessmann,
2008, 2011; Erosa et al., 2010; Manuelli and Seshadri, 2010). Other authors have
emphasized aspects of human capital such as health (Weil, 2007) and experience
(Lagakos et al., 2012).
2
quires assuming that there are only two imperfectly substitutable skill
types, that the elasticity of substitution between these skill types is the
same in all countries, and that this elasticity of substitution is equal
to the elasticity of substitution in countries where instrumental-variable
estimates are available (e.g. Angrist, 1995; Ciccone and Peri, 2005).
These assumptions are quite strong. For example, the evidence indi-
cates that dividing the labor force in just two skill groups misses out
on important margins of substitution (Autor et al., 2006; Goos and
Manning, 2007). Once there are more than 3 skill types, estimation
of elasticities of substitution becomes notoriously di¢ cult for two main
reasons. First, there are multiple, non-nested ways of capturing patterns
of substitutability/complementarity and this make it di¢ cult to avoid
misspecication (e.g. Du¤y et al., 2004). Second, relative skill supplies
and relative wages are jointly determined in equilibrium and estimation
therefore requires instruments for relative supplies. It is already chal-
lenging to nd convincing instruments for two skill types and we are
not aware of instrumental-variables estimates when there are 3 or more
imperfectly substitutable skills groups.
We explore an alternative to the parametric production function ap-
proach. In particular, we make the observation that when aggregate pro-
duction functions are weakly concave in inputs, assuming perfect substi-
tutability among di¤erent schooling levels yields an upper bound on the
increase in output that can be generated by more schooling. This is true
irrespective of the pattern of substitutability/complementarity among
schooling levels, as well as the pattern of cross-country non-neutrality in
technology. This basic observation does not appear to have been made
in the development accounting literature. It is worthwhile noting that
the production functions used in the development accounting literature
satisfy the assumption of weak concavity in inputs. Hence, our approach
yields an upper bound on the increase one would obtain using the pro-
duction functions in the literature. Moreover, the assumption of weakly
concave aggregate production functions is fundamental for the develop-
ment accounting approach as it is clear that without it, inferring mar-
ginal productivities from market prices cannot yield interesting insights
into the factors accounting for di¤erences in economic development.
The intuition for why the assumption of perfect substitutability yields
an upper bound on the increase in output generated by more schooling is
easiest to explain in a model with two schooling levels, schooled and un-
schooled. In this case, an increase in the share of schooled workers has,
in general, two types of e¤ects on output. The rst e¤ect is that more
schooling increases the share of more productive workers, which increases
output. The second e¤ect is that more schooling raises the marginal
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productivity of unschooled workers and lowers the marginal productiv-
ity of schooled workers. When assuming perfect substitutability between
schooling levels, one rules out the second e¤ect. This implies an over-
statement of the output increase when the production function is weakly
concave, because the increase in the marginal productivity of unschooled
workers is more than o¤set by the decrease in the marginal productivity
of schooled workers. The result that increases in marginal productiv-
ities produced by more schooling are more than o¤set by decreases in
marginal productivities continues to hold for an arbitrary number of
schooling types with any pattern of substitutability/complementarity as
long as the production function is weakly concave. Hence, assuming
perfect substitutability among di¤erent schooling levels yields an upper
bound on the increase in output generated by more schooling.
From the basic observation that assuming perfect substitutability
among schooling levels yields an upper bound on output increases, and
with a few ancillary assumptions mainly that physical capital adjusts
to the change in schooling so as to keep the marginal product of physical
capital unchanged we derive a formula that computes the upper bound
using exclusively data on the structure of relative wages of workers with
di¤erent schooling levels. We apply our upper-bound calculations to two
data sets. In one data set of 9 countries we have detailed wage data for
up to 10 schooling-attainment groups for various years between 1960
and 2005. In another data set of about 90 countries we use evidence on
Mincerian returns to proxy for the structure of relative wages among 7
attainment groups. Our calculations yield output gains from reaching a
distribution of schooling attainment similar to the US that are sizeable
as a proportion of initial output. However, these gains are much smaller
when measured as a proportion of the existing output gap with the
US. These results are in line with the conclusions from development
accounting (e.g. Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare, 1997; Hall and Jones,
1999; Caselli, 2005). This is not surprising as these studies assume that
workers with di¤erent schooling attainment are perfect substitutes and
therefore end up working with a formula that is very similar to our upper
bound.
A potential limitation of the parametric approach to development
accounting is that it typically assumes that changes in schooling attain-
ment leave technology unchanged.3 This assumption would be wrong if
3This is not always the case however. For example, a recent paper by Jones (2011)
computes rich-poor human capital ratios using relative wages in poor as well as rich
countries. His approach implies that computed human capital ratios will also reect
di¤erences in human capital quality and to the extent they a¤ect relative wages 
di¤erences in technology. In Jonesframework, the perfect substitution case yields a
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there were important schooling externalities or signicant appropriate-
technology e¤ects. We discuss the extent to which our nonparametric
upper bound is robust to endogenous technology responses. Perhaps
surprisingly, we nd that our approach also works in the appropriate-
technology framework developed and estimated by Caselli and Coleman
(2006). On the other hand, and less surprisingly, our approach does not
yield an upper bound in the presence of aggregate schooling external-
ities. However, the empirical evidence suggests that such externalities
are not large enough for our upper bound to be far o¤. We therefore con-
clude that our upper-bound calculations could well continue to be useful
even in a world where technology responds endogenously to relative skill
supplies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 derives the
upper bound. Section 3 shows the results from our calculations. Section
4 discusses the robustness of our upper-bound calculation to making
technology endogenous to schooling. Section 5 concludes.
2 Derivation of the Upper Bound
Suppose that output Y is produced with physical capital K and workers
with di¤erent levels of schooling attainment,
Y = F (K;L0; L1; :::Lm) (1)
where Li denotes workers with schooling attainment i = 0; ::;m. The
(country-specic) production function F is assumed to be increasing in
all arguments, subject to constant returns to scale, and weakly concave
in inputs. Moreover, F is taken to be twice continuously di¤erentiable.
The question we want to answer is: how much would output per
worker in a country increase if workers were to have more schooling.
Specically, dene si as the share of the labor force with schooling at-
tainment i, and s = [s0; s1::; si;:::sm] as the vector collecting all the shares.
We want to know the increase in output per worker if schooling were to
change from the current schooling distribution s1 to a schooling distrib-
ution s2 with more weight on higher schooling attainment. For example,
s1 could be the current distribution of schooling attainment in India and
s2 the distribution in the US. Our problem is that we do not know the
production function F .
To start deriving an upper bound for the increase in output per
worker that can be generated by additional schooling, denote physical
capital per worker by k and note that constant returns to scale and weak
lower bound on the income increase that can be achieved by raising human capital
in poor countries.
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concavity of the production function in (1) imply that changing inputs
from (k1; s1) to (k2; s2) generates a change in output per worker y2   y1
that satises
y2   y1  Fk(k1; s1)(k2   k1) +
mX
i=0
Fi(k
1; s1)(s2i   s1i ) (2)
where Fk(k1; s1) is the marginal product of physical capital given inputs
(k1; s1) and Fi(k1; s1) is the marginal product of labor with schooling
attainment i given inputs (k1; s1): Hence, the linear expansion of the
production function is an upper bound for the increase in output per
worker generated by changing inputs from (k1; s1) to (k2; s2).
We will be interested in percentage changes in output per worker and
therefore divide both sides of (2) by y1,
y2   y1
y1
 Fk(k
1; s1)k1
y1

k2   k1
k1

+
mX
i=0
Fi(k
1; s1)
y1
(s2i   s1i ): (3)
Assume now that factor markets are approximately competitive. Then
(3) can be rewritten as
y2   y1
y1
 1

k2   k1
k1

+ (1 1)
 
mX
i=0

w1iPm
i=0w
1
i s
1
i

(s2i   s1i )
!
(4)
where 1 is the physical capital share in output and w1i is the wage of
workers with schooling attainment i given inputs (k1; s1). Since schooling
shares must sum up to unity we have
Pm
i=0w
1
i (s
2
i s1i ) =
Pm
i=1 (w
1
i   w10) (s2i 
s1i ) and w
1 = w10 +
Pm
i=1 (w
1
i   w10) s1i and, (4) becomes
y2   y1
y1
 1

k2   k1
k1

+ (1  1)
0BBBB@
mX
i=1

w1i
w10
  1

(s2i   s1i )
1 +
mX
i=1

w1i
w10
  1

s1i
1CCCCA : (5)
Hence, the increase in output per worker that can be generated by ad-
ditional schooling and physical capital is below a bound that depends
on the physical capital income share and the wage premia of di¤erent
schooling groups relative to a schooling baseline.
2.1 Optimal Adjustment of Physical Capital
In (5), we consider an arbitrary change in the physical capital intensity.
As a result, the upper bound on the increase in output that can be gen-
erated by additional schooling may be o¤because the change in physical
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capital considered is suboptimal given schooling attainment. We now
derive an upper bound that allows physical capital to adjust optimally
(in a sense to be made clear shortly) to the increase in schooling. To
do so, we have to distinguish two scenarios. A rst scenario where the
production function is weakly separable in physical capital and school-
ing, and a second scenario where schooling and physical capital are not
weakly separable. In this section we develop the rst of these cases,
while in the appendix we develop the latter.
Assume that the production function for output can be written as
Y = F (K;G(L0; L1; :::Lm)) (6)
with F and G characterized by constant returns to scale and weak con-
cavity. This formulation implies that the marginal rate of substitution
in production between workers with di¤erent schooling is independent
of the physical capital intensity. While this separability assumption is
not innocuous, it is weaker than the assumption made in most of the
development accounting literature.4
We also assume that as the schooling distribution changes from the
original schooling distribution s1 to a schooling distribution s2; physi-
cal capital adjusts to leave the marginal product of capital unchanged,
MPK2 = MPK1: This could be because physical capital is mobile in-
ternationally or because of physical capital accumulation in a closed
economy.5 With these two assumptions we can develop an upper bound
for the increase in output per worker that can be generated by additional
schooling, that depends on the wage premia of di¤erent schooling groups
only. To see this, note that separability of the production function im-
plies
y2   y1
y1
 1

k2   k1
k1

+ (1  1)

G(s2) G(s1)
G(s1)

: (7)
The assumption that physical capital adjusts to leave the marginal prod-
uct unchanged implies that F1(k1=G(s1); 1) = F1(k2=G(s2); 1) and there-
fore k2=G(s2) = k1=G(s1): Substituting in (7),
y2   y1
y1
 G(s
2) G(s1)
G(s1)
: (8)
4Which assumes that the function F in (6) is Cobb-Douglas, often based on
Gollins (2002) nding that the physical capital income share does not appear to
vary systematically with the level of economic development. In the Appendix we
show that our approach can be extended to the case where physical capital displays
stronger complementaries with higher levels of schooling.
5See Caselli and Feyrer (2007) for evidence that the marginal product of capital
is not systematically related to the level of economic development.
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Weak concavity and constant returns to scale ofG imply, respectively,
G(s2) G(s1) Pmi=0Gi(s1)(s2i   s1i ) and G(s1) =Pmi=0Gi(s1)s1i , where
Gi denotes the derivative with respect to schooling level i: Combined
with (7), this yields
y2   y1
y1

mX
i=0
Gi(s
1)(s2i   s1i )
mX
i=0
Gi(s1)s1i
=
mX
i=1

w1i
w10
  1

(s2i   s1i )
1 +
mX
i=1

w1i
w10
  1

s1i
(9)
where the equality makes use of the fact that separability of the produc-
tion function and competitive factor markets imply
Gi(s
1)
G0(s1)
=
F2(k
1; G(s1))Gi(s
1)
F2(k1; G(s1))G0(s1)
=
w1i
w10
: (10)
Hence, assuming weak separability between physical capital and school-
ing, the increase in output per worker that can be generated by addi-
tional schooling is below a bound that depends on the wage premia of
di¤erent schooling groups relative to a schooling baseline.
2.2 The Upper Bound with a Constant Marginal
Return to Schooling
The upper bound on the increase in output per worker that can be
generated by additional schooling in (9) becomes especially simple when
the wage structure entails a constant return to each additional year of
schooling, (wi   wi 1)=wi 1 = . This assumption is often made in
development accounting, because for many countries the only data on the
return to schooling available is the return to schooling estimated using
Mincerian wage regressions (which implicitly assume (wi wi 1)=wi 1 =
). In this case, the upper bound for the case of weak separability
between schooling and physical capital in (9) becomes
y2   y1
y1

mX
i=1
((1 + )xi   1)(s2i   s1i )
1 +
mX
i=1
((1 + )xi   1)si
: (11)
where xi is years of schooling corresponding to schooling attainment i
(schooling attainment 0 is assumed to entail zero years of schooling).
The upper-bound calculation using (11) is closely related to analo-
gous calculations in the development accounting literature. In develop-
ment accounting, a countrys human capital is typically calculated as
(1 + )S (12)
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where S is average years of schooling and the average marginal return to
schooling  is using evidence on Mincerian coe¢ cients.6 One di¤erence
with our approach is therefore that development accounting calculations
identify a countrys schooling capital with the schooling capital of the
average worker, while our upper-bound calculation uses the (more theo-
retically grounded) average of the schooling capital of all workers. The
di¤erence, as already mentioned, is Jensens inequality.7 Another di¤er-
ence is that we use country-specic Mincerian returns while development
accounting often uses a common value (or function) for all countries.
2.3 Link to Development Accounting and Graphi-
cal Intuition
At this point it is worthwhile discussing the relationship between our
analysis of schoolings potential contribution to output per worker dif-
ferences across countries and the analysis in development accounting.
Following Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1996), development account-
ing usually assesses the role of schooling for output per worker under
the assumption that workers with di¤erent schooling are perfect sub-
stitutes in production. This assumption has been made because it is
necessary to explain the absence of large cross-country di¤erences in the
return to schooling when technology is Hick-neutral (e.g. Klenow and
Rodriguez-Clare, 1996; Hendricks, 2002). But there is now a consensus
that di¤erences in technology across countries or over time are gener-
ally not Hicks-neutral and that perfect substitutability among di¤erent
schooling levels is rejected by the empirical evidence, see Katz and Mur-
phy (1992), Angrist (1995), Goldin and Katz (1998), Autor and Katz
(1999), Krusell et al. (2000), Ciccone and Peri (2005), Caselli and Cole-
man (2006). Moreover, the elasticity of substitution between more and
6More accurately, human capital is usually calculated as exp(S), but the two
expressions are approximately equivalent and the one in the text is more in keeping
with our previous notation.
7To see the relation more explicitly, for small , (1 + )xi is approximately linear
and the right-hand side of (11) can be written in terms of average years of schooling
S =
Xm
i=1
xisi, as we do not miss much by ignoring Jensens inequality and assumingXm
i=0
(1 + )xisi  (1 + )S . As a result, if the Mincerian return to schooling is
small, the upper bound on the increase in output per worker that can be generated
by more schooling depends on the Mincerian return and average schooling only
y2   y1
y1
 (1 + )
S2   (1 + )S1
(1 + )S1
:
Another approximation of the right-hand side of (11) for small  that is useful
for relating our upper bound to the development accounting literature is (S2  
S1)=
 
1 + S1

.
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less educated workers found in this literature is rather low (between 1.3
and 2, see Ciccone and Peri, 2005 for a summary).
Hence, the assumption of perfect substitutability among di¤erent
schooling levels often made in development accounting should be dis-
carded. But this does not mean that the ndings in the development
accounting literature have to be discarded also. To understand why
note that the right-hand side of (9) our upper bound on the increase
in output per worker generated by more schooling  is exactly equal
to the output increase one would have obtained under the assump-
tion that di¤erent schooling levels are perfect substitutes in production,
G(L0; L1; :::; Lm) = a0L0 + a1L1 + :::+ amLm: Hence, although rejected
empirically, the assumption of perfect substitutability among di¤erent
schooling levels remains useful in that it yields an upper bound on the
output increase that can be generated by more schooling.
To develop an intuition for these results, consider the case of just two
labor types, skilled and unskilled, and no capital,
Y = G(LU ; LH) (13)
where G is taken to be subject to constant returns to scale and weakly
concave. Suppose we observe the economy when the share of skilled
labor in total employment is s1 and want to assess the increase in output
per worker generated by increasing the skilled-worker share to s2: The
implied increase in output per worker can be written as
y(s2)  y(s1)=G(1  s2; s2) G(1  s1; s1)
=
Z s2
s1
@G(1  s; s)
@s
ds
=
Z s2
s1
[G2(1  s; s) G2(1  s; s)] ds: (14)
Weak concavity of G implies that G2(1   s; s)   G1(1   s; s) is either
at or downward sloping in s: Hence, (14) implies that y(s2)   y(s1) 
[G2(1  s1; s1) G1(1  s1; s1)] (s2   s1) : Moreover, when factor mar-
kets are perfectly competitive, the di¤erence between the observed skilled
and unskilled wage in the economy w1H  w1U is equal to G2(1  s1; s1) 
G1(1   s1; s1). As a result, y(s2)   y(s1)  (w1H   w1U) (s2   s1). As
(w1H   w1U) (s2   s1) is also the output increase one would have obtained
under the assumption that the two skill types are perfect substitutes,
it follows that our upper bound is equal to the increase in output as-
suming perfect substitutability between skill types. Figure 1 illustrates
this calculation graphically.8 The increase in output is the pink area.
8We thank David Weil for suggesting this gure.
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The upper bound is the pink plus blue area. The gure also illustrates
that the di¤erence between our upper bound and the true output gain
is larger making our upper bound less tight the larger the increase
in schooling considered.9
It is important to note that once perfect substitutability has been
discarded, the particular way the development accounting question is
asked becomes very important. There are two main ways the question
has been asked in the literature. The rst is the one in Hall and Jones
(1999) which is also the focus of our paper: by how much would the out-
put gap shrink if the capital inputs of a factor scarce country increased
to the level of a factor rich country? The second way is to follow Klenow
and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) and ask what fraction of the variance in in-
come is attributable to variation in a certain factor. Such decompositions
are di¢ cult once skill-biased technology and imperfect substitutability
among skills are allowed for. What we have shown is that the perfect
substitution case provides an upper bound for the answer to the Hall
and Jones question.10
3 Estimating the Upper Bounds
We now estimate the maximum increase in output that could be gener-
ated by increasing schooling to US levels. We rst do this for a subsample
of countries and years for which we have data allowing us to perform the
calculation in equation (9). For these countries we can also compare the
results obtained using (9) with those using (11), which assume a con-
stant return to extra schooling. These comparisons put in perspective
the reliability of the estimates that are possible for larger samples, where
only Mincerian returns are available. We also report such calculations
for a large cross-section of countries in 1990.
3.1 Using Group-Specic Wages
We implement the upper-bound calculation in equation (9) for 9 coun-
tries for which we are able to estimate wages by education attainment
level using national censa data from the international IPUMS (Min-
9Our implementation of the upper bound below considers US schooling levels as
the arrival value. As a result, the increase in schooling considered is large for many
developing countries and our upper bound could be substantially larger than the true
output gain.
10In principle there is a third way of phrasing the question of development account-
ing: by how much would output in a factor-rich country fall if its factor endowment
fell to the level of a factor-poor country. Our main result implies that when the
production function is weakly concave in inputs, the decrease in output generated by
a fall in schooling is always greater than the decrease predicted under the assumption
of perfect substitutability.
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nesota Population Center, 2011). The countries are Brazil, Colom-
bia, Jamaica, India, Mexico, Panama, Puerto Rico, South Africa, and
Venezuela, with data for multiple years between 1960 and 2007 for most
countries. The details vary somewhat from country to country as (i)
schooling attainment is reported in varying degrees of detail across coun-
tries; (ii) the concept of income varies across countries; and (iii) the con-
trol variables available also vary across countries. See Appendix Tables
1-3 for a summary of the micro data (e.g. income concepts; number of
attainment levels; control variables available; number of observations)
and our Supplementary Appendix for country-by-country data and es-
timation results. These data allow us to estimate attainment-specic
returns to schooling and implement (9) using the observed country-year
specic distribution of educational attainments and the US distribution
of educational attainment in the corresponding year as the arrival value.
It is worthwhile noting that in implementing (9)  and also (11)
below  we estimate and apply returns to schooling that vary both
across countries and over time. Given our setup, the most immedi-
ate interpretation of the variation in returns to schooling would be that
there is imperfect substitutability between workers with di¤erent school-
ing attainments and that the supply of di¤erent schooling attainments
varies over time and across countries. It is exactly the presence of im-
perfect substitutability among di¤erent schooling levels that motivates
our upper-bound approach. Another reason why returns to schooling
might vary could be that there are di¤erences in technology. Our upper-
bound approach does not require us to put structure on such (possibly
attainment-specic) technology di¤erences. As we discuss in Section
4, our upper-bound calculation may continue to be correct even under
particular ways in which technology changes in response to changes in
schooling.11
The results of implementing the upper-bound calculation in (9) for
each country-year are presented (in bold face) in Table 1. For this group
of countries applying the upper-bound calculation leads to conclusions
that vary signicantly both across countries and over time. The largest
computed upper-bound gain is for Brazil in 1970, which is of the order
of 150%. This result largely reects the huge gap in schooling between
the US and Brazil in that year (average years of schooling in Brazil was
less than 4 in 1970). The smallest upper bound is for Puerto Rico in
2005, which reects the high schooling attainment by that year (average
years of schooling is almost 13). The average is 0.59.
11Another possible source of di¤erences in schooling returns across countries is
sampling variation. However our estimates of both attainment specic and Mincerian
returns are extremely precise, so we think this explanation is unlikely.
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A di¤erent metric is the fraction of the overall output gap with the
US that reaching US attainment levels can cover. This calculation is also
reported in Table 1 (characters in normal type). As a proportion of the
output gap, the largest upper-bound gain is for Brazil in 1980 (57%),
while the smallest is again for Puerto Rico in 2005 (virtually zero). On
average, at the upper bound, attaining the US education distribution
allows countries to cover 21% of their output gap with the US.
The shortcoming of the results in Table 1 is that they refer to a quite
likely unrepresentative sample. For this reason, we now ask whether us-
ing the approach in equation (11) leads to an acceptable approximation
of (9). As we show in the next section, data to implement (11) is read-
ily available for a much larger (and arguably representative) sample of
countries, so if (11) o¤ers an acceptable approximation to (9) we can be
more condent on results from larger samples.
To implement (11), we rst use our micro data to estimate Mincerian
returns for each country-year. This is done with an OLS regression using
the same control variables employed to estimate the attainment-specic
returns to schooling above.12 See Appendix Table 2 for point estimates
and standard errors of Mincerian returns for each country-year. Once
we have the Mincerian return we can apply equation (11) to assess the
upper-bound output gains of increasing the supply of schooling (assum-
ing that technology remains unchanged). The results are reported, as a
fraction of the results using (9), in the rst row of Table 2 (bold type).
This exercise reveals di¤erences between the calculations in (9) and (11).
On average, the calculation that imposes a constant proportional wage
gain yields only 77% of the calculation that uses attainment-specic re-
turns to schooling. Therefore, the rst message from this comparison is
that, on average, basing the calculation on Mincerian coe¢ cients leads
to a signicant underestimate of the upper-bound output increase asso-
ciated with attainment gains. However, there is enormous heterogeneity
in the gap between the two estimates, and the results from (11) are not
uniformly below those from (9). Almost one third of the estimates based
on (11) are larger. The signicant average di¤erence in estimates and the
great variation in this di¤erence strongly suggest that whenever possible
it would be advisable to use detailed data on the wage structure rather
than a single Mincerian return coe¢ cient. It is interesting to note that
the ratio of (11) to (9) is virtually uncorrelated with per-worker GDP. To
put it di¤erently, while estimates based on (11) are clearly imprecise, the
error relative to (9) is not systematically related to per-worker output.
Hence, one may conclude that provided the appropriate allowance is
12The empirical labor literature nds that OLS estimates of Mincerian returns to
schooling are often close to causal estimates, see Card (1999).
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made for the average gap between (11) and (9) some broad conclusions
using (11) are still possible.
We can also compare the results of our approach in (9) to the calcula-
tion combining average years of schooling with a single Mincerian return
in (11). The results are reported in the second rows of Table 2. On
average, the results are extremely close to those using (11), suggesting
that ignoring Jensens inequality is not a major source of error in the
calculations. However, the variation around this average is substantial.
3.2 Using Mincerian Returns Only
The kind of detailed data on the distribution of wages that is required
to implement the calculation in equation (9) is not often available. How-
ever, there are estimates of the Mincerian return to schooling for many
countries and years. For such countries, it is possible to implement the
approximation in (11).
We begin by choosing 1990 as the reference year. For Mincerian
returns we use a collection of published estimates assembled by Caselli
(2010). This starts from previous collections, most recently by Bils and
Klenow (2003), and adds additional observations from other countries
and other periods. Only very few of the estimates apply exactly to the
year 1990, so for each country we pick the estimate prior and closest to
1990. In total, there are approximately 90 countries with an estimate of
the Mincerian return prior to 1990. Country-specic Mincerian returns
and their date are shown in Appendix Table 4. For schooling attainment,
we use the latest installment of the Barro and Lee data set (Barro and
Lee, 2010), which breaks the labor force down into 7 attainment groups,
no education, some primary school, primary school completed, some
secondary school, secondary school completed, some college, and college
completed. These are observed in 1990 for all countries. For the reference
country, we again take the US.13
Figure 2 shows the results of implementing (11) on our sample of
90 countries. For each country, we plot the upper bound on the right
side of (11) against real output per worker in PPP in 1995 (from the
PennWorld Tables). Not surprisingly, poorer countries experience larger
upper-bound increases in output when bringing their educational attain-
ment in line with US levels. The detailed country-by-country numbers
are reported in Appendix Table 4.
Table 3 shows summary statistics from implementing (11) on our
sample of 90 countries. In general, compared to their starting point,
several countries have seemingly large upper-bound increases in output
13To implement (11) we also need the average years of schooling of each of the
attainment groups. This is also available in the Barro and Lee data set.
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associated with attaining US schooling levels (and the physical capital
that goes with them). The largest upper bound is 3.66, meaning that
output almost quadruples. At the 90th percentile of output gain, output
roughly doubles, and at the 75th percentile there is still a sizable increase
by three quarters. The median increase is roughly 45%. The average
country has an upper-bound increase of 60%.
Figure 3 plots the estimated upper bounds obtained using (11) as a
percentage of the initial output gap with the US.14 Clearly the upper-
bound output gains for the poorest countries in the sample are small as
a fraction of the gap with the US. For the poorest country the upper-
bound output gain is less than 1% of the gap with the US. For the
country with the 10th percentile level of output per worker, the upper-
bound gain covers about 5% of the output gap. At the 25th percentile of
the output per worker distribution, the upper-bound gain covers about
7% of the output gap, and at the median it is around 20%. The average
upper-bound closing of the gap is 74%, but this is driven by some very
large outliers.
4 Development Accounting and Endogenous Tech-
nology
A possible concern with the approach that characterizes the develop-
ment accounting literature is that the production function is assumed
to be invariant to changes in factor inputs. This may lead development
accounting to misjudge the output gap that can be accounted for by
input di¤erences. The literature points to two main ways in which in-
puts may a¤ect the production function. First, there may be a positive
external e¤ect of human capital on the overall e¢ ciency of the econ-
omy (e.g. Nelson and Phelps, 1966; Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988). For
example, a larger number of schooled workers may make it more likely
that the adaptation of an advanced technology to a particular country
is protable, which would lead countries with more schooling to have
higher levels of TFP. Second, rmstechnology choices may depend on
the relative prices of di¤erent factors, which in turn depend on relative
supplies. Such appropriate-technology considerations may lead the fac-
tor bias of the production function to change as the relative supply of
workers with di¤erent quantity of schooling changes (e.g. Basu andWeil,
1998; Acemoglu, 1998, 2002; Caselli and Coleman, 2006).
We can formalize these concerns as follows. Denote the mapping
14For the purpose of this gure the sample has been trimmed at an income level of
$60,000 because the four countries above this level had very large values that visually
dominated the picture.
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from a vector of input quantities X to output Y by
Y = F (X; (X)) = H(X); (15)
where  is a vector of parameters that depend on X if there are ex-
ternalities or if technology choice is a¤ected by factor inputs. For ex-
ample, in models with externalities that work through total factor pro-
ductivity, the function F may take the form A(X)G(X), where A(X)
would capture that total factor productivity changes when factor quan-
tities change. In models of appropriate technology F may be written
as G(A(X) 
 X), where A(X) is a vector of input-specic e¢ ciencies,
which in turn may depend on the relative supplies of di¤erent inputs.15
Development accounting is often understood as asking about the ef-
fect of an increase in input quantities X on output Y holding  constant
at the initial level of X. That is, development accounting is about quan-
tifying
Y 0   Y = F (X 0; (X))  F (X; (X)): (16)
This is a well-dened exercise, but strong believers in externalities or
appropriate technology may feel that it is of limited practical value if
 changes signicantly with X. Such critics would nd a calculation of
F (X 0; (X 0))  F (X; (X)) = H(X 0) H(X) more informative.
Our upper-bound formula is derived for any aggregate production
function featuring constant returns to scale and weak concavity. Hence,
our upper-bound calculation is robust to endogenous technology if the
function H(X) satises these restrictions. Perhaps surprisingly, this is
sometimes the case. Consider, in particular, the appropriate-technology
framework developed and estimated, with considerable empirical success,
by Caselli and Coleman (2006). The production function is
[(AuLu)
 + (AsLs)
]
1
 ; (17)
where Lu is unskilled labor, Ls is skilled labor, Au and As are factor-
augmenting technology terms, and 1=(1   ) is the elasticity of substi-
tution between skilled and unskilled labor. Perfectly competitive rms
in each country choose both inputs Lu and Ls and factor-augmenting
technology terms Au and As, subject to the production function in (17)
and a technology menu given by
A!s + A
!
u  B; (18)
where  and B are exogenous parameters. Under the parameter re-
striction ! > 1=(1  ), which is consistent with Caselli and Colemans
15The symbol 
 denotes the Kronecker product.
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estimates, it can be shown that the optimal technology choice of rms
is given by
Au =
B
1 + 

 !L
!
! 
s L
!
 !
u
 1
!
and As =
B=
1 + 

! L
!
! 
u L
!
 !
s
 1
!
: (19)
Plugging (19) in the production function in (17) we obtain the equivalent
of H(X), or the full mapping from inputs to outputs when endogenous
technology is accounted for. It can be shown that this function features
constant returns to scale and is concave, which implies that, at least in
this case, our proposed approach still delivers an upper bound on the
increase in income associated with a certain increase in schooling capital.
On the other hand, our upper-bound approach will generally not
work if there are schooling externalities that induce aggregate increasing
returns. This is clearly a limitation of our approach (and development
accounting in general). On the other hand, contrary to the case of
appropriate technology, the evidence for quantitatively large aggregate
schooling externalities is not very strong, suggesting that such exter-
nalities are unlikely in practice to signicantly a¤ect our quantitative
ndings.16 Instrumental-variables approaches suggest that there are no
signicant aggregate externalities to high-school attainment (e.g. Ace-
moglu and Angrist, 2001; Ciccone and Peri, 2006; Iranzo and Peri, 2009).
And while there do appear to be some aggregate externalities to college
attainment (Moretti, 2004; Iranzo and Peri, 2009), they seem to be too
small to overturn our main conclusion. According to Iranzo and Peri, an
additional year of schooling due to college attainment raises total factor
productivity by around 5%. For the typical poor country, taking college
attainment to the level of the US in 1990 would add less than 4 years
to average years of schooling . Hence, schooling externalities would add
around 30% to our upper bound once the induced increase in the phys-
ical capital intensity is accounted for.17 While this is not negligible, it
remains too small to signicantly increase the fraction of the output gap
being closed relative to our calculations.
5 Conclusion
How much of the output gap with rich countries can developing countries
close by increasing their quantity of schooling? Our approach has been
to look at the best-case scenario: an upper bound for the increase in
16For a review of evidence on schooling externalities at the microeconomic level,
see Rosenzweig (2012).
17This calculation assumes that the elasticity of output with respect to physical
capital is 0.33, see Gollin (2002).
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output that can be achieved by more schooling. The main advantage of
our approach is that the upper bound is valid for an arbitrary number of
schooling levels with arbitrary patterns of substitution/complementarity.
Another advantage is that the upper bound is robust to certain forms
of endogenous technology response to changes in schooling. Application
of our upper-bound calculations to two di¤erent data sets yields out-
put gains from reaching a distribution of schooling attainment similar
to the US that are sizeable as a proportion of initial output. However,
these gains are much smaller when measured as a proportion of the ex-
isting output gap with the US. This result is in line with the conclusions
from the development accounting literature, which is not surprising as
many development accounting studies assume that workers with di¤er-
ent schooling attainment are perfect substitutes and therefore end up
employing a formula that is very similar to our upper bound.
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Appendix: Non-Separability between Physical Cap-
ital and Schooling
Since Griliches (1969) and Fallon and Layard (1975), it has been ar-
gued that physical capital displays stronger complementaries with high-
skilled than low-skilled workers (see also Krusell et al., 2000; Caselli and
Coleman 2002, 2006; and Du¤y et al. 2004). In this case, schooling
may generate additional productivity gains through the complementar-
ity with physical capital. We therefore extend our analysis to allow
for capital-skill complementarities and derive the corresponding upper
bound for the increase in output per worker that can be generated by
additional schooling.
To allow for capital-skill complementarities, suppose that the pro-
duction function is
Y = F (Q [U(L0; ::; L 1); H(L ; ::; Lm)] ; G [K;H(L ; ::; Lm)]) (20)
where F;Q; U; and H are characterized by constant returns to scale and
weak concavity, andG by constant returns to scale andG12 < 0 to ensure
capital-skill complementarities. This production function encompasses
the functional forms by Fallon and Layard (1975), Krusell et al. (2000),
Caselli and Coleman (2002, 2006), and Goldin and Katz (1998) for exam-
ple (who assume that F;G are constant-elasticity-of-substitution func-
tions, that Q(U;H) = U , and that U;H are linear functions).18 The
main advantage of our approach is that we do not need to specify func-
tional forms and substitution parameters, which is notoriously di¢ cult
(e.g. Du¤y et al., 2004).
To develop an upper bound for the increase in output per worker that
can be generated by increased schooling in the presence of capital-skill
complementarities, we need an additional assumption compared to the
scenario with weak separability between physical capital and schooling.
The assumption is that the change in the schooling distribution from s1
to s2 does not strictly lower the skill ratio H=U , that is,
H(s22)
U(s21)
 H(s
1
2)
U(s11)
; (21)
where s1 = [s0; :::; s 1] collects the shares of workers with schooling lev-
els strictly below  and s2 = [s ; :::; sm] collects the shares of workers
with schooling levels equal or higher than  (we continue to use the su-
perscript 1 to denote the original schooling shares and the superscript
18Du¤y et al. (2004) argue that a special case of the formulation in (20) ts the
empirical evidence better than alternative formulations for capital-skill complemen-
tarities used in the literature.
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2 for the counterfactual schooling distribution). For example, this as-
sumption will be satised if the counterfactual schooling distribution
has lower shares of workers with schooling attainment i <  and higher
shares of workers with schooling attainment i   . If U;H are linear
function as in Fallon and Layard (1975), Krusell et al. (2000), Caselli
and Coleman (2002, 2006), and Goldin and Katz (1998), the assumption
in (21) is testable as it is equivalent to
 1X
i=0
w1i
w10
(s2i   s1i )
 1X
i=0
w1i
w10
s1i

mX
i=
w1i
w1
(s2i   s1i )
mX
i=
w1i
w1
s1i
, (22)
where we used that competitive factor markets and (20) imply w1i =w
1
0 =
F1Q1Ui=F1Q1U0 = Ui=U0 for i <  and w1i =w
1
 = (F1Q2 + F2G2)Hi
= (F1Q2 + F2G2)H = Hi=H for i   .
It can now be shown that the optimal physical capital adjustment
implies
k2   k1
k1
 H(s
2
2) H(s12)
H(s12)
: (23)
To see this, note that the marginal product of capital implied by (20) is
MPK = F2
0@1; G
h
k
H(s2)
; 1
i
Q
h
U(s1)
H(s2)
; 1
i
1AG1  k
H(s2)
; 1

: (24)
Hence, holding k=H constant, an increase in H=U either lowers the mar-
ginal product of capital or leaves it unchanged. As a result, k=H must
fall or remain constant to leave the marginal product of physical capital
unchanged, which implies (23).
Using steps that are similar to those in the derivation of (9) we obtain
U(s21)  U(s11)
U(s11)

 1X
i=0
w1i
w10
(s2i   s1i )
 1X
i=0
w1i
w10
s1i
; (25)
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where we used w1i =w
1
0 = (F1Q1Ui)=(F1Q1U0) = Hi=H for i < ; and
k2   k1
k1
 H(s
2
2) H(s12)
H(s12)

mX
i=
w1i
w1
(s2i   s1i )
mX
i=
w1i
w1
s1i
; (26)
where we used w1i =w
1
 = (F1Q2Hi + F2G2Hi) = (F1Q2H + F2G2H ) =
Hi=H for i   and (23). These last two inequalities combined with
(20) imply
y2   y1
y1
 1
0BBBB@
 1X
i=0
w1i
w10
(s2i   s1i )
 1X
i=0
w1i
w10
s1i
1CCCCA+ (1  1)
0BBBB@
mX
i=
w1i
w1
(s2i   s1i )
mX
i=
w1i
w1
s1i
1CCCCA ; (27)
where 1 is the share of workers with schooling levels i <  in aggregate
income. Hence, with capital-skill complementarities, the increase in out-
put per worker that can be generated by additional schooling is below a
bound that depends on the income share of workers with schooling levels
i <  and the wage premia of di¤erent schooling groups relative to two
schooling baselines (attainment 0 and attainment ).
To get some intuition on the di¤erence between the upper bound in
(9) and in (27), note that the upper bound in (27) would be identical
to the upper bound in (9) if, instead of 1, we were to use the share of
workers with schooling levels i <  in aggregate wage income. Hence,
as the share of workers with low schooling in aggregate wage income
is greater than their share in aggregate income, (27) puts less weight
on workers with low schooling and more weight on workers with more
schooling than (9) (except if there is no physical capital). This is because
of the stronger complementarity of better-schooled workers with physical
capital.19
19The main di¢ culty in estimating 1 is dening threshold schooling  : If  was
college attainment, the upper bound could be quite large because developing countries
have very low college shares and the increase in college workers would be weighted
by the physical capital income share plus the college-worker income share (rather
than the much smaller college-worker income share only). If  is secondary school,
the di¤erence with our calculations would be small.
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Figure 2: Upper-bound income increase from moving to US attainment
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 70000 80000 90000
Figure 3: Upper-bound income increase as percent of income gap with US
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0.757 0.604 0.403 0.860
0.568 0.353 0.132 0.235
Figures in bold type are percent income increases, based on equation (9) 
[i.e. use attainment-specific returns to education]
Figures in normal type are percent income increases as share of income gap with US.
1970 figure refers to 1971 for Venezuela and 1973 for Colombia; 
1980 figure refers to 1981 for Venezuela, 1982 for Jamaica, and 1983 for India; 
1990 figure refers to 1987 for India and 1991 for Brazil and Jamaica; 
1995 figure refers to 1993 for India and 1996 for South Africa; 
2000 figure refers to 1999 for India and 2001 for Jamaica, South Africa, and Venezuela; 
2005 figure refers to 2004 for India and 2007 for South Africa
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Table 1: Upper-bound income increase from moving to US attainment
Brazil
Colombia
Jamaica
Mexico
Panama
India
1960 1970 1980 1990 1995 2000 2005
0.828 0.749 0.743 0.657
0.816 0.821 0.880 0.773
0.839
0.873
1.052 1.269 0.439
1.092 1.255 0.431
0.915 0.954 0.907 0.866 0.842
1.037 1.100 1.042 1.017 1.000
1.137 1.195 0.983 1.109 0.886
1.049 1.105 1.055 1.311 1.024
0.934 0.984 0.978 1.017
1.065 1.202 1.231 1.278
0.996 1.023 0.992 -1.748 0.134
1.237 1.285 1.369 -4.333 -0.479
0.711 0.612 0.694
0.861 0.739 0.855
0.693 0.917 1.112 0.283
0.612 0.958 1.172 0.283
Figures in bold type assume constant returns to each additional year of schooling [based on equation (11)]; 
Figures in nornal type assume constant returns and assign to all workers the average years of 
schooling [based on equation (12)]; 
1970 figure refers to 1971 for Venezuela and 1973 for Colombia; 
1980 figure refers to 1981 for Venezuela, 1982 for Jamaica, and 1983 for India; 
1990 figure refers to 1987 for India and 1991 for Brazil and Jamaica; 
1995 figure refers to 1993 for India and 1996 for South Africa; 
2000 figure refers to 1999 for India and 2001 for Jamaica, South Africa, and Venezuela; 
2005 figure refers to 2004 for India and 2007 for South Africa
Puerto Rico
South Africa
Venezuela
Table 2: Alternative measures of upper-bound income increase
Brazil
Colombia
Jamaica
Mexico
Panama
India
 from moving to US attainment
assuming constant returns to each additional year of schooling
mean max 90th percentile 75th percentile median
% Income increase based on (11) 0.61 3.66 1.20 0.68 0.45
% Income increase based on (12) 0.80 7.59 1.48 0.82 0.54
Table 3: Upper-bound  income increase in a large cross section
Appendix  Table 1: Description of individual-level data
Income concept used in the analysis : total income per hour worked for 1980, 1991, 
2000; total income for 1970.
Other income concepts available:  earned income per hour worked for 1980, 1991, 
2000 (yield nearly identical results as income concept used for 1991 and 2000 but 
a significantly negative return to schooling in 1980).
Control variables used in the analysis:  age, age squared, gender, marital status, 
age*marital status, gender*marital status, dummies for region (state) of birth, 
dummies for region (state) of residence, dummy for urban area, dummy for foreign 
born, dummies for religion, dummies for race (except 1970).
Educational attainment levels: 8
Income concept used in the analysis:  total income for 1973.
Other income concepts available:  none.
Control variables used in the analysis:  age, age squared, gender, marital status, 
age*marital status, gender*marital status, dummies for region (state) of birth, 
dummies for region (municipality) of residence, dummy for urban area, dummy for 
foreign born.
Educational attainment levels: 9
Income concept used in the analysis:  wage income for 1983, 1987, 1993, 1999, 
2004.
Other income concepts available:  none.
Control variables used in the analysis:  age, age squared, gender, marital status, 
age*marital status, gender*marital status, dummies for region (state) of residence, 
dummy for urban area, dummies for religion.
Educational attainment levels: 8
Income concept used in the analysis:  wage income for 1982, 1991, 2001.
Other income concepts available:  none.
Control variables used in the analysis:  age, age squared, gender, marital status, 
age*marital status, gender*marital status, dummies for region (parish) of birth, 
dummies for region (parish) of residence, dummy for foreign born, dummies for 
religion, dummies for race.
Educational attainment levels: 7
Income concept used in the analysis:  earned income per hour worked for 1990, 
1995, 2000; earned income for 1960; total income for 1970.
Other income concepts available: total income per hour for 1995, 2000.
Control variables used in the analysis: age, age squared, gender, marital status, 
age*marital status, gender*marital status, dummies for region (state) of birth, 
dummies for region (state) of residence, dummy for urban area, dummy for foreign 
born, dummies for religion (except 1995).
Educational attainment levels: 10
Note:  Point estimates of the Mincerian regressions and the number of observations available 
are summarized in Appendix Tables 2 and 3. For more details on the variables 
see https://international.ipums.org/international/.
Brazil
Colombia
India
Jamaica
Mexico
Appendix  Table 1: Continued
Income concept used in the analysis: wage income per hour worked for 1990, 
2000; wage income for 1970; total income per hour worked for 1980.
Other income concepts available: earned income per hour worked for 1990, 2000; 
total income per hour worked for 1990 (yield nearly identical results as income 
concept used).
Control variables used in the analysis: age, age squared, gender, marital status, 
age*marital status, gender*marital status, dummies for region (state) of birth 
(except 1990), dummies for region (district) of residence, dummy for urban area 
(except 1990), dummy for foreign born (except 1980).
Educational attainment levels: 8
Income concept used in the analysis:  wage income per hour worked for 1970, 
1980, 1990, 2000, 2005.
Other income concepts available:  total income per hour worked for 1970, 1980, 
1990, 2000, 2005; earned income per hour worked for 1990, 2000, 2005 (yield 
nearly identical results as income concept used.
Control variables used in the analysis:  age, age squared, gender, marital status, 
age*marital status, gender*marital status, dummies for region (metropolitan area) 
of residence, dummy for foreign born, dummies for race (only 2000, 2005).
Educational attainment levels: 8
Income concept used in the analysis:  total income per hour worked for 1996, 2007; 
total income for 2001.
Other income concepts available:  none.
Control variables used in the analysis:  age, age squared, gender, marital status, 
age*marital status, gender*marital status, dummies for region (province) of birth 
(except 1996), dummies for region (municipality) of residence, dummy for foreign 
born, dummies for religion (except 2007), dummies for race.
Educational attainment levels: 6
Income concept used in the analysis:  earned income per hour worked for 1971, 
1981, 2001; earned income for 1990.
Other income concepts available:  total income per hour worked 2001 (yields a 
Mincerian return to schooling of 13.7% as compared to 4.4% using earned 
income).
Control variables used in the analysis:  age, age squared, gender, marital status, 
age*marital status, gender*marital status, dummies for region (state) of birth, 
dummies for region (province) of residence, dummy for foreign born.
Educational attainment levels: 10
Note:  point estimates of the Mincerian regressions and the number of observations available 
are summarized in Appendix Tables 2 and 3. For more details on the variables 
see https://international.ipums.org/international/.
Puerto 
Rico
South 
Africa
Venezuela
Panama
1960 1970 1980 1990 1995 2000 2005
Brazil 0,124 (0,00005) 0,113 (0,00004) 0,115 (0,00004) 0,109 (0,00003)
Colombia 0,0889 (0,0005)
India 0,083 (0,00002) 0,0866 (0,00002) 0,074 (0,00002) 0,0776 (0,00001) 0,0788 (0,00001)
Jamaica 0,125 (0,002) 0,0573 (0,002) 0,0614 (0,001)
Mexico 0,123 (0,0002) 0,0993 (0,0001) 0,0682 (0,0001) 0,114 (0,0001) 0,094 (0,0001)
Panama 0,0879 (0,002) 0,0911 (0,0003) 0,0941 (0,0003) 0,0916 (0,0005)
Puerto Rico 0,099 (0,0003) 0,088 (0,0005) 0,0938 (0,0005) 0,0985 (0,0005) 0,116 (0,0004)
South Africa 0,117 (0,0001) 0,11 (0,0002) 0,143 (0,0002)
Venezuela 0,0625 (0,0005) 0,0875 (0,0003) 0,0732 (0,0002) 0,0443 (0,0005)
1970 figure refers to 1971 for Venezuela and 1973 for Colombia; 
1980 figure refers to 1981 for Venezuela, 1982 for Jamaica, and 1983 for India;  
1990 figure refers to 1987 for India and 1991 for Brazil and Jamaica; 
1995 figure refers to 1993 for India and 1996 for South Africa; 
2000 figure refers to 1999 for India and 2001 for Jamaica, South Africa, and Venezuela; 
2005 figure refers to 2004 for India and 2007 for South Africa
Appendix Table 2:  Estimated Mincerian returns and robust standard errors in parentheses
1960 1970 1980 1990 1995 2000 2005
Brazil 14660440 24720720 33616046 41010810
Colombia 3127210
India 86928152 45901965 109703806 133891583 139597372
Jamaica 255720 409100 443629
Mexico 4470106 6183300 14303270 18762057 21316086
Panama 246250 367330 408540 653460
Puerto Rico 653200 775220 698772 732668 1000738
South Africa 6775030 8299308 9360012
Venezuela 1540174 2567310 3548928 5038900
1970 figure refers to 1971 for Venezuela and 1973 for Colombia; 
1980 figure refers to 1981 for Venezuela, 1982 for Jamaica, and 1983 for India; 
1990 figure refers to 1987 for India and 1991 for Brazil and Jamaica; 
1995 figure refers to 1993 for India and 1996 for South Africa; 
2000 figure refers to 1999 for India and 2001 for Jamaica, South Africa, and Venezuela; 
2005 figure refers to 2004 for India and 2007 for South Africa
Appendix Table 3: Number of observations used in the individual-level Mincerian regressions
Estimate Year
Kuwait 76562 -0.14 4.5 1983 0.275 0.317 -1.95
Norway 73274 -0.10 5.5 1995 0.132 0.141 -1.29
Zimbabwe 610 106.79 5.57 1994 0.337 0.370 0.00
Uganda 1525 42.13 5.1 1992 0.535 0.572 0.01
Vietnam 2532 24.99 4.8 1992 0.411 0.425 0.02
Ghana 2313 27.44 7.1 1995 0.477 0.578 0.02
Philippines 5897 10.16 12.6 1998 0.330 0.411 0.03
Nepal 2008 31.76 9.7 1999 1.197 1.518 0.04
Sri Lanka 6327 9.40 7 1981 0.355 0.408 0.04
China 3234 19.34 12.2 1993 0.769 0.964 0.04
Zambia 2595 24.35 11.5 1994 1.084 1.342 0.04
Cameroon 4490 13.65 6.45 1994 0.683 0.753 0.05
Peru 13101 4.02 5.7 1990 0.207 0.239 0.05
Estonia 15679 3.20 5.4 1994 0.169 0.181 0.05
Russian Federation 16108 3.08 7.2 1996 0.165 0.172 0.05
Kenya 2979 21.08 11.39 1995 1.135 1.353 0.05
Tanzania 1640 39.10 13.84 1991 2.225 2.676 0.06
Bulgaria 14140 3.65 5.25 1995 0.214 0.235 0.06
India 3736 16.61 10.6 1995 1.067 1.421 0.06
Bolivia 7624 7.63 10.7 1993 0.498 0.658 0.07
Indonesia 6413 9.26 7 1995 0.661 0.758 0.07
Sudan 3747 16.56 9.3 1989 1.248 1.417 0.08
Nicaragua 5433 11.11 12.1 1996 0.947 1.303 0.09
Honduras 7599 7.66 9.3 1991 0.674 0.763 0.09
Egypt 11387 4.78 5.2 1997 0.452 0.511 0.09
Dominican Republic 10739 5.13 9.4 1995 0.528 0.652 0.10
Slovak Republic 22834 1.88 6.4 1995 0.229 0.265 0.12
Poland 19960 2.30 7 1996 0.280 0.302 0.12
Croatia 20606 2.19 5 1996 0.274 0.299 0.13
Paraguay 10450 5.30 11.5 1990 0.719 0.851 0.14
Costa Rica 18352 2.58 8.5 1991 0.362 0.411 0.14
El Salvador 12182 4.40 7.6 1992 0.680 0.776 0.15
Czech Republic 31215 1.11 5.65 1995 0.186 0.210 0.17
Thailand 10414 5.32 11.5 1989 0.934 1.084 0.18
Ecuador 15528 3.24 11.8 1995 0.606 0.820 0.19
Sweden 47480 0.39 3.56 1991 0.076 0.080 0.20
Panama 17119 2.84 13.7 1990 0.568 0.770 0.20
Australia 54055 0.22 8 1989 0.046 0.038 0.21
Cyprus 37843 0.74 5.2 1994 0.162 0.178 0.22
Tunisia 13927 3.72 8 1980 0.829 1.006 0.22
Chile 23403 1.81 12.1 1989 0.442 0.546 0.24
Pakistan 6624 8.93 15.4 1991 2.180 3.439 0.24
Appendix Table 4: Data and results for the large sample
Output  in 
1995
% Gap 
with US
Mincerian return % Gain 
using (11)
% Gain 
using (12)
% Gap 
closed
Argentina 23222 1.83 10.3 1989 0.448 0.542 0.24
Korea, Rep. 33210 0.98 13.5 1986 0.262 0.406 0.27
Botswana 17280 2.81 12.6 1979 0.751 1.056 0.27
Cote d'Ivoire 4512 13.58 20.1 1986 3.660 7.593 0.27
Mexico 25835 1.55 7.6 1992 0.426 0.496 0.28
Morocco 7759 7.48 15.8 1970 2.109 3.550 0.28
Malaysia 23194 1.84 9.4 1979 0.524 0.657 0.29
South Africa 22638 1.91 11 1993 0.562 0.668 0.29
Colombia 18808 2.50 14.5 1989 0.787 1.044 0.32
Guatemala 10530 5.25 14.9 1989 1.674 2.193 0.32
Turkey 22996 1.86 9 1994 0.605 0.736 0.32
Hungary 27326 1.41 8.9 1995 0.501 0.588 0.36
Venezuela, RB 26164 1.51 9.4 1992 0.579 0.689 0.38
Jamaica 14588 3.51 28.8 1989 1.621 2.268 0.46
Canada 54026 0.22 8.9 1989 0.106 0.108 0.49
Brazil 16676 2.95 14.7 1989 1.451 1.903 0.49
Israel 53203 0.24 6.2 1995 0.126 0.149 0.53
Slovenia 32991 0.99 9.8 1995 0.553 0.693 0.56
Iran, Islamic Rep. 22339 1.95 11.6 1975 1.095 1.483 0.56
Greece 42141 0.56 7.6 1993 0.318 0.368 0.57
Portugal 35336 0.86 8.73 1994 0.569 0.658 0.66
Denmark 52032 0.26 5.14 1995 0.185 0.197 0.70
Finland 45289 0.45 8.2 1993 0.337 0.374 0.74
Ireland 52868 0.24 9.81 1994 0.234 0.266 0.96
Japan 51674 0.27 13.2 1988 0.264 0.333 0.97
Netherlands 59684 0.10 6.4 1994 0.117 0.127 1.14
Hong Kong 57093 0.15 6.1 1981 0.190 0.229 1.25
United Kingdom 51901 0.27 9.3 1995 0.342 0.405 1.28
Spain 50451 0.30 7.54 1994 0.449 0.541 1.48
Switzerland 57209 0.15 7.5 1991 0.255 0.314 1.70
Austria 56728 0.16 7.2 1993 0.300 0.331 1.88
France 58784 0.12 7 1995 0.300 0.347 2.52
Germany 56992 0.15 7.85 1995 0.392 0.480 2.54
Italy 63260 0.04 6.19 1995 0.305 0.344 7.63
Belgium 64751 0.02 6.3 1999 0.154 0.171 9.58
Singapore 63009 0.04 13.1 1998 0.634 0.724 14.36
United States 65788 0.00 10 1993 0.000 0.000 n.a.
Iraq n.a. n.a. 6.4 1979 0.567 0.664 n.a.
Taiwan n.a. n.a. 6 1972 0.330 0.293 n.a.
Note: Output per worker from Penn World Tables.
